Comments of an anonymous referee and an associate editor of this journal were particularly useful in the revision stage. Remaining errors are mine. This is a substantially revised version of Aoyagi 1998. Abstract This paper studies collusion in repeated Bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each rm are their private information and are positively correlated. It derives general su cient conditions for e cient collusion through communication and a simple grim-trigger strategy. This analysis is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond di erently to price deviations. In this model, it is shown that the above su cient conditions hold if idiosyncratic noise terms are su ciently small.
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Stigler 1964 studies collusion in repeated Bertrand oligopoly when rms observe stochastic demands for their own product only. Collusion is hard to sustain in such a n e n vironment as no coordination device exists for punishing secret price-cutting." To see the problem, consider a grim-trigger strategy which reverts to the one-shot Nash equilibrium after a low demand signal. If noisy but informative public signals are available, such a strategy can maintain collusion with su ciently low discounting. Namely, a bad public signal makes simultaneous reversion to punishment possible whether it was caused by secret price-cutting or otherwise. Reversion to punishment is a best response if every other rm is doing the same. Such coordination is clearly impossible based only on noisy private signals. The conclusions of Sekiguchi 1997, Bhasker and van Damme 1997, and Mailath and  Morris 1999 on this class of games all appear to indicate that approximate coordination is possible only if those private signals are accurate indicators of other players' action choice or private signals conditional on every action pro le.
When players publicly communicate their signals during the course of play, on the other hand, their announcements serve as public signals on which actions can be coordinated. As demonstrated by Kandori and Matsushima 1998 and Compte 1994 , this alternative formulation leads to a much more permissive conclusion. For e ective communication, of course, each player must be given a proper incentive to report their signals truthfully. This paper extends the analysis of communication in repeated games with private monitoring when the rms' private signals are correlated conditional on each price pro le. Correlation of private signals is a distinguishing feature of this paper and gives rise to a very simple grim-trigger collusion scheme based on a logic entirely di erent from that used in the above papers.
The collusion scheme considered in this paper is described as follows: Each rm i chooses the collusive price p i during the collusion phase and reports a summary of their private signal at the end of every period. In particular, rm i reports either 0" or 1" depending on whether his signal in that period was below o r a b o v e a certain threshold m i . Play stays in the collusion phase if and only if the reported signals of all the rms are unanimous i.e., all 0" or all 1". Reversion to the punishment phase with the one-shot Nash equilibrium 3 takes place otherwise. If the correlation of private signals is su ciently high conditional on the price pro le p = p 1 ; : : : ; p n , then reversion to punishment is a rare event on the path so that the equilibrium will be almost e cient. Now consider the rms' incentives. Facing the test described above, a patient rm would try to maximize the probability of unanimous report pro les in the reporting stage. With correlated signals, it is shown that each rm i which has chosen price p i nds it optimal to report 1" if and only if its signal is higher than some threshold m i p i . In particular, when i has chosen the collusive price p i , the use of the threshold m i p i = m i as speci ed by the scheme is optimal. Suppose then that rm i engages in secret price-cutting p i p i . Since its price cut most likely reduces the demand level of every other rm, rm i may w ant to report 0" even if its signal is above m i i.e., set the threshold m i p i higher than m i in order to maintain unanimity. It will be shown that no such deviation is pro table if it discontinuously lowers the level of correlation of private signals.
One natural interpretation of the above conditions can be obtained in a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond di erently to price deviations. In this model, it will be shown that the above conditions on the correlation of private signals hold when idiosyncratic noise terms are small.
Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have received relatively little attention until recently. Although Stigler's 1964 work on repeated Bertrand oligopoly motivates Green and Porter 1984 to study repeated games with imperfect monitoring, the latter choose to work with public signals for tractability. Many useful theorems have since been obtained for this case.
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For games with private monitoring, there exist two distinct approaches. The rst approach, which assumes no communication among players, is taken by Bhasker and Van Damme 1997 , Compte 1996 , Fudenberg and Levine 1991 , Lehrer 1989 , Mailath and Morris 1999 , and Sekiguchi 1997 Although it is largely inconclusive whether or not collusion is sustained without communication, a strong indication is that e ciency requires monitoring to be near perfect or near public. The second approach, which assumes communication, is rst suggested by Matsushima 1990. 3 His idea is subsequently 1 See, for example, Abreu et al. 1990 and Fudenberg et al. 1994. 2 See also Amarante 1998. 3 The idea of introducing communication into dynamic games is rst proposed by F orges 4 developed by Kandori and Matsushima 1998 and Compte 1994 , who each identify informational conditions for folk theorems.
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As mentioned above, the present paper belongs to the second category. Its informational assumptions, however, are di erent in nature from those in Kandori and Matsushima 1998 or Compte 1994 . More discussion on these points is given in Section 6.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a formal model. Section 3 proves the optimality of cuto reporting under correlated signals. The main theorem of the paper is given in Section 4. Sections 5 applies this theorem to a model in which demand signals consist of multiple random components. Some related issues are discussed in Section 6. Although the discussion of this paper is totally embedded in the Bertrand framework, it will be clear that all the conclusions will hold in any other games that have the same information structure.
Model
The set I of n 2 rms produce and sell products over in nitely many periods. In every period t, rm i chooses price p t i from the set R + of non-negative real numbers, and then privately observes its own demand d t i 2 R + whose probability distribution depends on the price pro le p t = p t 1 ; : : : ; p t n of all rms. E G i p i ; d i jp . We assume that the function g i : R n + ! R is bounded i.e., sup p2R n + jg i pj 1, and that the stage-game has a pure Nash equilibrium price pro le p e = p e 1 ; : : : ; p e n , i.e., g i p i ; p e , i g i p e for any i 2 I and p i 2 R + . F or simplicity, the one-shot equilibrium payo g i p e is normalized to zero.
In the collusion scheme considered in this paper, every rm i is required to publicly report either r t i = 0 or 1 given its demand signal d t i at the end of each period t. Firm i's Myerson 1986. 4 See also Ben-Porath and Kahneman 1996. 5 None of the conclusions will be a ected if prices are instead assumed to be positive i n tegers. Let 2 0; 1 be the common discount factor of the rms.
Given the strategy pro le = 1 ; : : : ; n , rm i's average payo V i ; in the repeated game is de ned in the usual manner. A Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is a strategy pro le such that V i ; V i 0 i ; , i ; for every 0 i and i 2 I. An equilibrium is public if each i is public. A public equilibrium is perfect if every continuation strategy pro le after any public history is again a public equilibrium.
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This paper analyzes a simple grim-trigger public equilibrium with the collusion and punishment phases. It is characterized by three sets of parameters p = p 1 ; : : : ; p n 2R + , T2N , and m = m 1 ; : : : ; m n 2R n + .p is the price pro le to be sustained in the collusion phase, and satis es g i = g i p 0 for each i 2 I. F or example, it can be the price vector that maximizes the collusive pro t P n i=1 g i p o v er p 2 R n + . T is the cycle of the game as explained below. m i is the threshold that rm i is supposed to use in the reporting of its private signals in the collusion phase: it should report r t i = 1 i f d t i m i and r t i = 0 i f d t i m i . W e suppose that is T-segmented in the sense that it divides the repeated game into T separate component games that are independent of each other. 8 Speci cally, the t th component game 1 t T consists of periods t;T + t;2T + t ; : : : , and the reported signals in any period only a ect the continuation play in the same component game. Within each component game, is the standard grim-trigger strategy pro le: It starts with the 6 Note that a rm's report can depend on the current private signal even if it uses a public strategy. 7 See Fudenberg et al. 1994. 8 This construction follows that of Ellison 1994 . This technique is also used in Sekiguchi 1997. 6 collusion phase and stays there if and only if report pro le r is unanimous in the sense that r 1 = =r n . It will revert to the punishment phase otherwise. Firm i's strategy i chooses p i and reports signal d i based on the threshold m i as speci ed above in the collusion phase. In the punishment phase, it chooses the one-shot Nash equilibrium price p e i .
It is clear that the rms face no incentive problem in the punishment phase. The numbers T and m will be chosen so that it is optimal for every rm to choose p i and report truthfully in the collusion phase.
Correlated Signals and Cuto Reporting
The threshold m i for reporting by rm i is speci ed so that if every other rm j uses threshold m j , the probability of unanimous report pro les under the price pro le p is maximized when rm i also uses the threshold m i . Formally, w e assume that there exists m = m 1 ; : : : ; m n 20;1 n such that 1a In general, it is di cult to establish the existence of m that satis es these conditions. 9 If n = 2, or if the distribution P j p is symmetric, however, it can be veri ed that some mild regularity conditions on P guarantee the existence of such thresholds.
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Based on these m 1 ; : : : ; m n , the demand levels are assumed to be positively correlated" across rms in the following sense: The conditional probabilities for a liated distributions are interpreted as the regular version derived from the densities. For the discussion of a liation, see Weber 1982, and Karlin and Rinott 1980. 8 collusion phase, and a e i = p e i ; b i in the punishment phase. With slight abuse of notation, we let P j a denote the probability distribution of the report pro le r under the action pro le a = a 1 ; : : : ; a n . Theorem 1 below states that the reporting ruleb i maximizes the probability of unanimous pro les and hence the likelihood of staying in the collusion phase regardless of rm i's price choice. For each report pro le r = r 1 ; : : : ; r n 2 f 0 ; 1 g n , let sr = 0 i f r is unanimous in the sense that r 1 = =r n , and sr = 1 otherwise. i : Theorem 1 below describes the conditions on and i which ensure the existence of an almost e cient equilibrium for su ciently patient rms. In particular, the desired conclusion holds if is su ciently small in absolute terms as well as when compared to i . The right inequality and 2 imply v i g i , , while the left inequality implies 3.
Demand Functions with Multiple Random Components
In this section, the above theorem is applied to a symmetric model in which the demand signal d i is expressed as the sum of three non-negative random variables u, w and z i as follows:
where q i : R n + ! R + is a deterministic function of the price pro le p, and 0 i s a constant. Note that u and w are common for every i, while z i is idiosyncratic to each rm. One interpretation is that u resp. w describes the behavior of global" consumers who regard the products of the n rms as substitutes resp. complements because of their technology or taste, while z i captures local" consumers for whom the n products are highly di erentiated. For concreteness, suppose that the function q i is strictly decreasing in p i and strictly increasing in p j j 6 = i. For symmetry, w e require that q i p = q j p 0 for any i, j 2 I and p, p 0 such that p i = p 0 j , p j = p 0 i , and p ,i,j = p 0 ,i,j . The assumption that w or z i does not depend on price is purely for simplicity.
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We assume that u and w are independent and have the density functions f u and f w , respectively. The idiosyncratic terms z 1 ; : : : ; z n are independent of one another and of u and w, and have the identical density function f z . I n accordance with the assumption that u, w and z i are all non-negative, f u , f w and f z all equal zero on ,1; 0. It is also assumed that each one of them is strictly positive and continuous on R + .
The following property of a density function implies the positive correlation of demand signals in the sense of Assumption 1: A density function f on R is a Polya function of degree 2 PF 2 , Karlin 1968 Pmin j6 The last assumption concerns the functional form of q i . As is usually the case in Bertrand models, a small price deviation by a n y rm i from the symmetric price pro le p is assumed to have a discontinuous" e ect on the behavior of q i p i ; p , i and q j p i ; p , i . Speci cally, assume that there exists 1 such that for any i 6 = j, Theorem 2 can be illustrated as follows: Suppose for simplicity that = 0. In this case, if rm i chooses p i and reports truthfully, then every rm receives exactly the same signal so that the probability of non-unanimous pro les on the path is zero. On the other hand, suppose that rm i secretly cuts its price to p i . If a unanimous report is to be achieved, rm i needs to estimate the value of q j u+w conditional on the observation of q i u+w. Since neither u nor w is directly observed, a range of possibilities must be allowed as to the values of these random variables. This, however, results in the loss of accuracy. T o see this, suppose for simplicity that there are only two rms i and j. The probability of non-unanimous pro les is then given by i = Pq i u + w m i ; q j u + w m j + P q i u + w m i ; q j u + w m j : Figure 1 depicts the corresponding areas when m i =m j 2 1; q i =q j . Note by 7 that the ratio of coe cients of u in d i and d j changes discontinuously in response to any price deviation by i so that the two lines in the gure have signi cantly di erent slopes for any p i 6 = p i .
Consequently, rm i cannot make the probability i arbitrarily small by simply adjusting the threshold m i . 13
It should be noted that the above discussion also suggests that the same conclusion holds when the demand function is instead given by d i = s i pu + t i pw + z i for some function t i : R n + ! R + , as long as s i and t i behave su ciently di erently from each other around p for any price deviation by i.
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6. Discussions
Theorem 1 requires the correlation of private signals to be high on the equilibrium path, and strictly lower o the path. This condition should be contrasted with the informational assumptions used in the models of private monitoring without communication Sekiguchi 1997 , Bhasker and van Damme 1997 , and Mailath and Morris 1999 . In these models, monitoring is either nearly perfect in that a player's private signal accurately re ects other players' action choice, or nearly public in that it accurately re ects their private signals, both conditional on every action pro le. High correlation of private signals on the path in the current model is close to the assumption of near public monitoring conditional on the particular pro le p . 14 Lower correlation o the path, on the other hand, implies that a player's private signal is less accurate as an indicator of others' private signals conditional on any pro le p i ; p , i p i 6 = p i . It is this gap in the levels of accuracy that this collusion scheme exploits.
The informational assumptions of this paper are also di erent in nature from the distinguishability conditions" used by Kandori and Matsushima 1998 and Compte 1994 . The distinguishability conditions require that given any action pro le and any pair of players i and j, i's deviation be statistically distinguishable from j's deviation when private signals of players other than i and j are jointly evaluated. 15 Clearly, these conditions require the existence of three or more players. They also require the niteness of the action set. Their generalization to games with in nite actions, such as the standard Bertrand game, is not straightforward.
Speci cally, w e need to have s i p i ;p ,i s j p i ;p ,i t j p i ;p ,i t i p i ;p ,i bounded away from one for any p i 6 = p i .
14 Note, however, that high correlation relative to thresholds m 1 ; : : : ; m n is much w eaker than near public monitoring.
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To be more precise, this must be true at every action pro le which corresponds to an extreme point of the feasible payo set. This description of the conditions is based on Kandori and Matsushima 1998. Compte's 1994 conditions are similar but slightly di erent. 14 In some cases, it is not inconceivable that rms spy on their competitors' prices in an e ort to facilitate collusion. The paper's conclusion, however, suggests that they may instead agree to use a much simpler scheme which makes such monitoring activities redundant. It remains open whether communication during the course of play is really necessary to sustain collusion. It should be noted, however, that even in models without explicit communication, some form of communication before the game is implicitly assumed. Otherwise, the players have di culty agreeing on a particular equilibrium. Although attempts by competing rms to exchange information through meetings such as trade associations have been often found illegal under Sherman Act Scherer 1980, Section 19, there appear to be many other less conspicuous ways of communicating one's private signals to its competitors. Bidders' using the last few digits of bids as a communication device in the Federal spectrum auctions is a well-known example. As another example, we can ask the motive behind airline companies' large newspaper advertisements with detailed fares which are not necessarily honored. 16 With the correlation of private signals, it is possible to consider an alternative s c heme which requires each rm i to report its raw demand signal d i and suggests reversion to punishment if and only if the discrepancy between the maximum and minimum of those reported numbers exceeds some threshold. This approach, however, runs into some di culty. In our formulation, the number of viable deviations can be e ectively limited by the consideration that for any deviation in reporting, there exists an alternative cuto reporting rule that is at least as good Lemma 1. In this alternative s c heme, on the other hand, it is di cult to identify such a natural class of deviations. This makes the veri cation of the incentive conditions much more di cult. Therefore, replacing b i byb i increases the probability of a unanimous report pro le.
Proof of Lemma 2: For any i n teger l 1, a non-negative function K : R l ! R + is said to be multivariate totally positive of order 2 MTP 2 , Karlin and Rinott 1980 if Kx^yKx _ y KxKy for every x, y 2 R l .
Given any price p i , write q j = q j p i ; p , i for j 2 I and y i = q i u + w and y j = q j u + w j 6 = i. Suppose rst that p i 6 = p i so that q i 6 = q j if j 6 = i. Since the last quantity can be made smaller than 2 when is small enough, and since is arbitrary, w e conclude that ! 0 a s ! 0.
B There exist 0 and 0 such that if . Note that the last quantity is independent o f p i ; m i , and can be made smaller than 2 if is su ciently small. It can be shown through an argument similar to that in A that the remaining two terms on the right-hand side of a1 are bounded above b y 2 each for small enough. Since 0 is arbitrary, w e h a v e the desired conclusion.
iii There exist 0 and 0 such that inf f p i ; m i : p i p i ; m i 2 R + g for . 
